Home // FDEF // Department o... // News // Bank Competition, Bank Runs and Opacity

Bank Competition, Bank Runs and Opacity

twitter linkedin facebook email this page
Add to calendar
Speaker: Toni Ahnert – Bank of Canada
Event date: Monday, 02 December 2019 12:30 pm - 01:45 pm
Place: University of Luxembourg
Metz/Nancy Room
29 Boulevard J.-F. Kennedy
L-1855 Luxembourg


We examine the competition among and the opacity of banks
subject to rollover risk. Banks imperfectly compete for uninsured
deposits and choose the opacity of their risky investment. In a
static setup, higher bank competition increases the deposit rate,
which increases withdrawal incentives due to strategic
complementarity and thus raises bank fragility. In a dynamic setup
with entry, a theory of bank opacity arises. Opacity trades off a
static cost of larger withdrawals and costly liquidation of investment
with a dynamic benefit of deterring entry and reducing future
competition. We use our framework to evaluate the regulation of
competition or transparency. We find that greater competition
increases deposit rates, fragility, and transparency, while minimum
transparency regulation increases both current and future fragility
and future competition.

Data: Invitation_T. Ahnert_02.12.19.pdf 424.08 kB